ABSTRACT: Using a data set published by the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS), patterns of demand and supply for higher education courses from 1996-97 to 1999-00 are analysed. Most universities saw a fall in applications and enrolments following the introduction of tuition fees and maintenance loans, though this effect varies across institutions and regions of the UK. A model of applications and acceptances is developed and tested. Applications are sensitive to each institutions entry standards, reputation and location in the UK. Acceptances depend on teaching funding per head and the number of funded places each institution is given.
Introduction
This paper identifies the recent trends in Higher Education (HE) recruitment, mainly through a data set published by the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS). A series of total applications and acceptances from 1996-97 to 1999-00 is constructed for 97 leading UK universities. Patterns of applications and acceptances are compared over time, between institutions and regions of the UK. Although interesting, broad patterns alone cannot explain why some institutions are more popular than others and if students are attracted to particular regions. Because applications and acceptances are part of a larger system, a model of applications and acceptances is developed and estimated. This helps cast light on the impact, if any, of tuition fees, which were introduced in 1998/99.
From the mid 1980s, HE in the UK experienced a rapid expansion. Between 1983-84 and 1993-94 , there was a 54% growth, with the majority taking place among full-time undergraduates, which grew by 67% (HEFCE, 2001a ) (see figure 1). After this, growth was more modest, with total student numbers increasing by 6% between 1996-97 and 2000-01. The main cause of this expansion was the growth in the number of 18-21 year olds taking university courses. The age participation index rose from 15% in 1983-84 to 30% in 1993-94 (see figure 2). Participation by mature students has also increased. An ambitious target of 50% participation for the 18-30 age group has been set by the government for 2010. However, which qualifications are to be included in the definition of HE (THES, 2001 ) is still being reviewed. This may make any comparisons with the above trends spurious.
Figures 1 and 2 near here HEFCE (2001a) suggest a number of reasons for the growth in student numbers. First, the introduction of the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) in 1988 (normally taken by students at age 16) improved the staying-on rate after compulsory schooling, through an increase in academic attainment at 16 (see also Mcintosh, 2001; McVicar and Rice, 2001 ). Secondly, structural changes in the UK economy, particularly the expansion of the service sector, increased the demand for graduate labour. Managerial class employment has increased while the number of unskilled jobs has fallen. Moreover, some traditional non-graduate jobs have been upgraded to graduate status, since they are now more likely to be filled by degree holders. One reason for the rise in income inequality from the late 1970s onwards has been the rise in the graduate premium over less qualified labour and there is greater awareness that `graduateness' is a key factor in labour market success (see Blundell et al., 1997) . High unemployment in the 80s and early 90s was also an important push factor, especially for ethnic minorities who are strong demanders for HE (see Johnes and Taylor, 1989; Leslie and Drinkwater, 1999; Leslie et al. 2002) .
Teaching funding is allocated to UK universities according to the number of students each recruits. Recruitment targets have increased since the mid 1980s. For example, the Maximum Aggregate Student Number (MASN) 1 set by the Higher Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE) for all HE Institutions (HEIs) grew by 19% between 1994 19% between -95 and 2000 19% between -01, from 695,434 to 825,341 places (HEFCE, 2001a . However, cumulative enrolments fell short by 21,982 and in the last academic year (2000-01) alone some 14,465 funded places remained unfilled (see figure 3) . The post-1992 ('new') universities 2 have experienced the most difficulty in maintaining current recruitment levels (The Times, 2001 ). This has created major funding problems, because many of them expanded during the 1980s to meet the general rise in student demand. Many universities currently experience difficulties in balancing their budgets (HEFCE, 2001b) .
Participating in HE has become more expensive. Students contribute to the cost of university education through the payment of tuition fees and maintenance loans. Non-means tested maintenance loans were introduced in 1990/91 to partially replace means tested maintenance grants, although tuition remained free. Grants remained frozen until 1994/95 with a further shift to a loan element to replace grants. Tuition fees, set at £1000, further increased direct costs in 1998.
Tuition fees are charged at a flat rate and students can be either fully or partially exempt. Students are eligible for either all or part of the maintenance loan, which is repaid after graduation at a zero real interest rate, subject to achieving a minimum salary.
Tuition fees should not be seen as a major expense, when the overall costs of education are considered. Foregone earnings are a far bigger cost and the results will show that there was in fact little or no impact on applications. The major effect was on acceptances. Approximately 400,000 applicants per annum apply to UCAS for undergraduate courses offered on behalf of 260 UK HEIs, covering around 42,000 separate courses. Postgraduate and part-time students apply to universities directly. The UCAS process is summarized in figure 4 . The system is competitive and each applicant is allowed to make up to six applications (four in medicine), at the same or different institutions (usually by the beginning of January in the year they propose to go to university). So in what follows the difference between an applicant (one person) and an application (up to six per person) should be noted. The institutions then make offers, which can be either conditional (i.e. subject to achieving the entry requirements) or unconditional. Applicants make a first (firm) choice and second (insurance) choice. Applicants without any offers automatically enter the clearing process.
The majority of UK applicants receive conditional offers and only know whether they are accepted after receiving the results of their post-16 qualifications. 3 They may be accepted by either their firm or insurance offers. However, applicants without any unconditional offers enter the clearing process, which runs from late August to early October. Institutions who have failed to achieve their target number of students advertise course vacancies and applicants contact institutions directly. Applicants can only accept one of the clearing offers they receive, after which they leave the admissions system. Overall, 76.7% of UK applicants were successful over the period 1996-2000.
Figure 4 near here Market Trends
UCAS publishes a data set (see www.ucas.ac.uk) on applications and acceptances to courses offered by the HEIs who are members. The focus is on the leading 97 UK universities for which a measure of quality is available, and those applicants classified as UK domiciled, which account for 75.5% of all applications made through UCAS and 74.5% of acceptances, from 1996-2000. This result is peculiar to these two 'elite' institutions and demonstrates a selfselection effect, whereby only the brightest students who are confident of securing a place at these institutions consider applying. These two outliers also re-inforce the need for a formal model of applications and acceptances. be the realized average entry grade for the institution. In simple terms the idea is that an institution that wishes to expand, ceteris paribus, will be required to drop its entry standards.
Similarly, raising entry standards can ration supply. Table 5 shows the average entry standards for the highest 20 and the lowest 20 institutions. 
The demand equation is specified for each institution i, where i=1,…..,97 and for the four years of entry t=1,2,3,4.
it AP is the number of places demanded for courses offered by institution i at time period t.
P is the lagged entry standard of the institution (which might be thought of as roughly equivalent to the price variable in an elementary economics textbook exposition of the market supply and demand model). A good initial hypothesis is that applications should be responsive to entry grades (in lagged form), but whether this actually turns out to be the case is a moot point. The reason for this doubt reflects the institutional structure of the admissions process. If applicants were limited to just one application, then the case for negative demand price elasticity would be clearer. There is a hierarchy of ability among applicants, and each has some idea of how well they are likely to do in their examinations. If there were just a 'one-shot' chance then only the most able and confident would apply for the hardest courses. A downward sloping demand equation might be expected in this case. But with up to six applications permitted and the fact that clearing offers a second chance, the picture is blurred somewhat. 5
There may be a Veblen good effect. Courses with high entrance standards may attract more applications because of a `prestige effect' and the Veblen good effect is more likely if applicants can make several applications, as is the case under the UCAS system. It is clear that admissions officers do to some extent engage in this complex problem of signalling quality. If the bid price is lowered this may actually reduce applications because this sends a signal of poor quality. It is also clear that institutions would quickly lose credibility if offer prices and market clearing prices were to diverge significantly. 6 Against this, institutions with low entrance standards may attract additional applications because of the insurance choice effect.
Thus the impact of entry grades on applications remains ambiguous. The justification for lagging this variable is that applications are made prior to the realized entry grade being known. Furthermore, advertised entry requirements are only indicative, many institutions will drop grade requirements during clearing. it Z is a vector of shift variables, which includes a quality ranking variable and dummy variables to represent pre-and post-92 universities, Oxbridge entry, year of entry and regions of the UK where each institution is located. The quality ranking variable is described in table 6 for the highest and lowest 20 institutions, and excludes entrance grades from the measure.
Table 6 near here
The position of an institution in published league tables may favourably influence the number of applications it receives. The 'new'/'old' university dummy allows for differences in the pattern of applications between the pre-and post-92 universities. Also Oxford and Cambridge universities appear to be special cases, in that that they receive comparatively fewer applications compared to other 'elite' institutions -there is a definite `why bother to apply?' effect at work illustrated by well publicised rejection of candidates with highest Alevels but not apparently made of the `right stuff'. Regional dummies are needed given the conclusions from table 3, suggesting that demand for places could be affected by the location of an institution within the UK. Year dummies account for time differences not otherwise explained, for example the impact of the introduction of tuition fees in 1998 as well as secular trends in HE popularity.
Supply (
it AC ) is specified as:
where it P is the current entry standard and it X is a vector of exogenous variables that influence supply. APit is included since the number of acceptances is conditional on the number of applications. Both Pit and Xit are instrumented, using the remaining exogenous variables in the system as instruments. and Included in Xit is the MASN for each institution, its total teaching funding per head and dummy variables for Oxbridge entry, pre-92 vs. post-92 institutions and the year of entry. The MASN is used for each institution since any change in the institution's recruitment target is likely to be reflected in a change in institutional acceptances. Higher teaching funding per head may act as an incentive for a university to accept more students. A dummy for Oxbridge is included. For many institutions beyond a certain level of acceptances the supply curve is effectively vertical. Consequently the price will simply rise to whatever level is required to clear the market. In terms of the supply and demand model there is a short-run vertical supply schedule. If demand shifts to the right, all the adjustment takes place in a rising price, which then clears the market. There is, however, a maximum price and beyond that other ways of rationing are needed (interviewing etc) -table 5 suggests this maximum value effect for Oxbridge, which traditionally does a lot of prescreening of applicants. Whether the institution is a 'new' or 'old' university is also likely to influence the level of acceptances (see tables 1 and 2). Dummy variables for the year of entry are also included.
In this model the realized average entry grade will adjust to clear the market. Institutions who fail to recruit enough students relative to target have the option of adjusting their entry requirements, whereas institutions that have popular courses will raise the entry standard to ration the available supply but this is subject to certain institutional constraints (discussed later). So grades are endogenous in the education model in the same way price is endogenous in the basic supply and demand framework. This is why the raw application/acceptance data of Table 3 has to be carefully interpreted because both variables are endogenous. The low application to acceptance ratio of Oxbridge is not symptomatic of failure -witness once again the high entrance standards of table 5.
The entry grade variable may not be freely flexible as the equivalent price variable in the simple supply and demand model; rather, there is probably a ratchet effect in operation.
Typically courses/institutions will make bid prices or offer grades. Any applicant who reaches the prescribed grade is guaranteed a place. If a greater number than expected reaches the prescribed grade, the institution is obliged to increase the supply of places to meet the demand -there have only been very rare instances when institutions renege on offers. So there are difficulties in an institution making a short-run rise in its price to ration demand.
What it can do is raise the bid price in future years. However, no such institutional constraint is present on the downside to increase supply, other than a negative effect on the credibility of the institution. There is an upper but no lower bound constraint in the short run. 7
Ideally institutions would wish to meet a set target (with a limited flexibility either way) without recourse to clearing. However, because of the obligation to meet demand at the offer price, there is strong pressure not to underbid the offer price. So the offer price is likely to be optimistic if anything. Clearing can actually be seen as a rational response to this institutional constraint. Nevertheless it is a fact of life that it is the less prestigious institutions that more readily use clearing to clear the market. The 2001/02 round suggests that universities are using clearing more frequently, which is squeezing the less prestigious institutions even more.
The educational model cannot, however, be completed by simply adding the equilibrium 2. Not all applicants are accepted. Market clearing is not synonymous with each applicant being accepted, as in the supply and demand model. Should the approach be better termed as an excess demand model? Not necessarily, because in the supply and demand model, the demand variable is the satisfied demand. There would be less satisfied demand if the price rose. Here applications will include some whose demand will not be satisfied because they achieve a grade below the market clearing level for the particular course/institution that they are prepared to enter. Unlike the simple supply and demand model, this unsatisfied demand is included in the application data.
3.
A more subtle reason is that the education model is more akin to a first-degree discriminating monopolist, rather than a competitive market. So even if factors 1 and 2 did not hold, there still would not be a simple market clearing condition. In the supply and demand model, there is one single universal price charged to all. In the education model, the market clearing price is a marginal price `charged to' the lowest qualified candidate that clears the market. Non-marginal candidates will have grades at least as good as the marginal grade. Consequently the average grade (which is what is observed) will typically exceed the marginal grade that clears the market.
In summary, the third market clearing equation is a relationship between price, applications and acceptances, which must account for the above factors. No attempt will be made to estimate this third latent equation, but the discussion emphasises that applications and entry grades should be treated as endogenous in the acceptance equation. The applications equation can be estimated by OLS because it contains only one lagged dependent variable in the regressor list.
Estimation results
Equations (1) and (2) were estimated by pooling observations on the 97 UK universities over the four years of entry, where figure 5 summarises the variables used. 8 A log-linear specification was adopted so coefficients give elasticities. In the applications equation,
Greater London was the default region and 1996-97 the default time dummy. . Surprisingly, current entry grades do not appear to have a significant impact on acceptances. 9 Both the teaching funding per head and MASN variables are significant and positive. This suggests that the allocation of additional student places by the funding councils (i.e. a rise in the MASN) leads to the institution accepting more students onto its courses, while those institutions that are awarded higher teaching funding per head have an incentive to accept more students.
The MASN variable may be tracking some more complex dynamics alluded to in the theoretical discussion, but not directly tracked in the regression equation. Consider a university that `over-recruits' and is obliged to meet an unexpectedly high demand at its offer grades -the case of the horizontal short-run supply schedule. It is probable that such success is rewarded in subsequent years by a higher MASN. It may be that these strong short-run effects dominate the entry grade variable and accounts for its insignificance.
The new/old university dummy is significant and positive, suggesting that the post-92 sector accepts more students, a finding supported by table 1. Oxbridge accepts fewer students.
Only one dummy for the year of entry (1997-98) has a significant positive effect on acceptances. There are two possible reasons for this result. First, institutions were forward looking, in the sense they accepted more applicants in the year before tuition fees/maintenance loans were introduced to ensure recruitment was maximized, expecting a fall in applications the year after. Secondly, applicants avoided gap years to avoid the costs of going to university and some applicants would accept second choices, rather than sitting out a year to improve their qualifications.
Tables 7 & 8 near here
9 A random effects panel data model was also estimated, but this also revealed little success with a
Concluding Comments
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this investigation of the changing pattern of applications and acceptances to UK universities. First, many institutions have experienced uncertain demand for their 'products', with fluctuating applications and acceptances.
Established patterns were disrupted by the introduction of tuition fees in 1998. While some institutions suffered a fall in applications, demand recovered in the last year of the sample.
The main impact of tuition fees appears to have been a fall in the overall application/acceptance ratio from 6.67 to 6.27 in 1997/98, and tables 7 and 8 suggest that this fall was mainly being driven from the acceptance side. Acceptances have grown at a faster rate than applications. For the full sample of universities, applications grew by 0.34% from 1996 to 1999, but acceptances increased by 10.16%. Universities appear to have overestimated the negative demand side impact of tuition fees and perhaps there was a somewhat panic stricken over-reaction.
A number of further factors may have added to the tuition fee effect on acceptances. First, institutions have become less selective in the face of limited growth in applications but with a need to maximize acceptances to maintain funding. Secondly, more applicants are achieving their conditional offer(s) -with a process of grade inflation operative in the face of little change in entry standards. It is clear that factors specific to a given institution play an important role in determining the level of applications and acceptances. Specifically, the ranking (prestige) of an institution, its location in the UK and whether it is a pre-92 university or former polytechnic are all important factors. There is a well-defined Oxbridge effect, which discourages applications except from those who might be expected to achieve the highest qualifications.
So what does this work suggest about the possibility of increasing participation in HE to meet government targets of a 50% participation overall in HE? The large rise in demand for HE instrumented entry grade and applications variable. 1 9 8 9 -9 0 1 9 9 0 -9 1 1 9 9 1 -9 2 1 9 9 2 -9 3 1 9 9 3 -9 4
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